As Iraq moves closer to its first post-Saddam election, two vital political points of intense fluctuation and debate bedevil analysis: the recent embrace of the apparently-poised-to-win United Iraqi Alliance of secularism and their combined stance on US troop withdrawal. Following the conflicting statements from their leaders it is a worthwhile exercise in distinguishing between
speakers and factions, which is why Dexter Filkins’
Shiites in Iraq Say Government Will Be Secular is somewhat frustrating.
“The senior leaders of the United Iraqi Alliance, the coalition of mostly Shiite groups that is poised to capture the most votes in the election next Sunday, have agreed that the Iraqi whom they nominate to be the country's next prime minister would be a lay person, not an Islamic cleric.”
Which leaders? Was the leader from SCRIRI, Abdul-Aziz Hakim present? The only leader cited is Adnan Ali of the Dawa party, and maybe, further down in the article, Dr. Shahristani. Did the agreement come from a communique or press conference? On these points Filkins is curiously silent. Is this reticence due to the increased violence and threats against candidates? Regardless, a move towards secularism has some obvious benefits for the alliance. It would be a knowledgeable admission that Islamic theocracies govern very poorly, if at all, a point supported by an unnamed Shiite leader:
“One Iraqi Shiite leader, who recently traveled to Tehran, the Iranian capital, said he was warned by the Iranians themselves against putting clerics in the government.
"They said it caused too many problems," the Iraqi said.”
[An intriguing admission from the Iranians that their faltering regime is not a fungible model, and further evidence that as horrific as Iran is, it is not a strict totalitarian state, notably in its lack of an expansionist agenda. While the clerical regime is Iran has long supported Shiite sponsored terrorist groups like Hezbollah, there is a key Persian-centric aspect to their nationalism that largely excludes neighboring Arabs and is unkind to Kurds.]
Included in questions of viable governance is the realpolitik consideration that a secular regime can better reach out to Sunnis frightened by Shiite dominance, perhaps with guarantees of religious rights. Downplaying the Shiite nationalist strains and embracing secularism could be a hopeful step towards the sort of Lockean tolerance advocated by liberal Iraqi intellectuals. However, trimming the promise of even a mild form of Islamic government has drawbacks for the Alliance and many of its key constituents. Shi’a Islam is the henotic force that brought the coalition together in the first place, and as the article mentions (and as Sistani’s recent actions dictate) clerics might simply retreat to a behind the scenes role, a Richlieu in every ministry. SCRIRI is an acronym for the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, not the Secular Revolution. To what degree are politicians like Hakim truly committed to secularism? Filkins states:
“During the drafting of the country's interim constitution last year, Mr. Hakim and others pushed for an expansive role for Islam in the new state, as well as restrictions on the rights of women.”
The other possible drawback is that the current focus on secularism allows radicals like Moqtada Al-Sadr, with his 14 candidates running on the Alliance ticket, to cry foul and raise the banner of Iraqi nationalism and Shiite radicalism. Sadr has already castigated Sistani, Dawa and SCIRI as Iranians (though I’ve read some reports that he’s gotten funding from Iran as well) and before his first uprising of ’03, he declared an Islamic Republic in Sadr City that no one showed up for. It will be quite a complex political evolution before he becomes a secularist.
Another troublesome consideration lies in the degree of American influence that accompanied this decision. At the end of The New Yorker profile of
Iyad Allawi, Jon Lee Anderson reports the following:
“A prominent Iraqi politician, who is running for the National Assembly as a member of the religious Shiite coalition, told me that the Americans had quietly let the leading candidates know that there were three conditions that they expected the next Iraqi government to meet. “One, it should not be under the influence of Iran,” he said. “Two, it should not ask for the withdrawal of American troops. And, three, it should not install an Islamic state.”
The United Iraqi Alliance of a month ago openly defied all three, now it is publicly much closer to the American “conditions”. The relative merits of these points are ethically complicated by the unknown weight that “the Americans” put behind their expectations. Conventional wisdom, as typified by David Brooks’ essay
Can We Save Iraq? No, but the Iraqis Can, asserts that the American-led Occupation effort has lost the leverage to seriously effect political outcomes in Iraq. If true, then let’s hope the “conditions” were accepted on their own virtues by an alliance of mostly religious parties who have seen the Lockean light while free of coercion.
AK